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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to make explicit and explore in detail some of the 
implicit assumptions that informed my book, Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia Did Not: 
Global Economic Divergence, 1600-1850. While the theoretical and methodological 
perspectives that inform the work are laid out in the introduction and conclusion of the 
book, why these frameworks were chosen is not elaborated upon. The emergence and 
impact of the Anthropocene, the new epoch which our planet has entered, are essential to 
the arguments of the book and in my opinion worth elucidation. The Anthropocene is a 
scientific category. The concept emerged from within the community of Earth System 
scholars and refers to a new epoch that followed the Holocene and in which humans 
constitute the dominant driver of change to the Earth System.  The power of humanity to 
transform our planet demands a rethinking of historical practices and priorities. By 
making explicit the implicit assumptions of my work this paper represents a contribution 
to that rethinking. 
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A GRANDE DIVERGÊNCIA NO ANTROPOCENO 
Resumo: O objetivo deste artigo é explicitar e explorar em detalhe alguns dos 
pressupostos implícitos que informaram meu livro, Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia Did 
Not:Global Economic Divergence, 1600-1850. Ao passo que ex na e na conclusão do livro as 
perspectivas teóricas e metodológicas que o informaram, não desenvolvi ali as razões do 
enquadramento que adotei. A emergência e o impacto do Antropoceno, a nova época em 
que entrou o nosso planeta, são essenciais aos argumentos do livro e na minha opinião 
merecem elucidação. O Antropoceno é uma categoria científica. O conceito emergiu no 
interior da comunidade de estudiosos da Ciência do Sistema Terra e se refere a uma época 
que seguiu o Holoceno e na qual os humanos constituem a força de mudança do Sistema Terra . O poder humano de transformar o nosso planeta demanda que se repensem nossas 
práticas e prioridades históricas. Explicitando os pressupostos do meu trabalho, este 
ensaio é uma contribuição para esse repensar.  
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Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to make explicit and explore in detail some of 
the implicit assumptions that informed my book, Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia 
Did Not: Global Economic Divergence, 1600-1850.2 While the theoretical and 
methodological perspectives that inform the work are laid out in the introduction 
and conclusion, why these frameworks were chosen is not elaborated upon. The 
emergence and impact of the Anthropocene, the new epoch which our planet has 
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entered, are essential to the arguments of the book and in my opinion worth 
elucidation.  
Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia Did Not departs from the dominant 
approach to the problem of divergence, which is to identify how Europe was 
different from the economically advanced regions of Asia and attribute divergence 
to that difference. Some of the differences that have been cited as making Europe 
more dynamic are capitalism, greater economic sophistication, superior 
institutions, higher rationality, and a more scientific culture. Why Europe Grew Rich 
and Asia Did Not argued that these purported differences are not supported by the 
evidence and that economic institutions, standards of living, scientific knowledge 
and technological dynamism were comparable across the advanced regions of 
Europe and Asia. However, these regions did not face the same economic, political 
and environmental pressures. It was this difference in pressures or context, along 
with varied state responses, that led to economic divergence.  
Two pressures were critical. The first was competition in the global trade in 
manufactures, which was dominated by the cotton textile exports of India. From 
the seventeenth century Europe suffered from Indian dominance, while the 
advanced regions of China, for example, did not face this problem. The second 
pressure was environmental and stemmed from growing deforestation, which 
affected both Europe, especially Britain, and parts of China. Responding to these 
dual pressures, with the aid of state policies of protection and promotion, Britain 
gave rise to the cotton revolution and the coal-steam complex, which produced a 
radical global economic divergence. The advanced regions of China faced one of 
these pressures, the environmental, but did not elicit state support for a response. 
The advanced regions of India faced neither of these pressures.  
While my arguments for comparability have been debated, my 
methodological claims have received less attention.3 The planetary predicament 
that we face today, and is captured in the concept of the Anthropocene, was critical 
for my approach. We face monumental choices on how we should organize our 
                                                             
3 For an overview of the debate, see PARTHASARATHI, Prasannan; POMERANZ, Kenneth. The Great 
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economies, polities and societies, but so too did those who lived in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. It was those choices made by individuals in the past that 
gave rise to global economic divergence and the economic and environmental 
conditions provided the context for those choices.  
The paper will proceed as follows. It will begin with a definition and 
description of the Anthropocene. It will then explore some of the ways in which 
historians have interpreted the impact of the Anthropocene on historical practices 
and the writing of history. It turns next to a discussion of how the Anthropocene 
has shaped my thinking on divergence. It will conclude with a discussion of how 
the Anthropocene forces us to rethink the possibilities of convergence in the global 
economy.   
 
The Anthropocene 
The Anthropocene is a scientific category. The concept emerged from 
within the community of Earth System scholars and refers to a new epoch which 
followed the Holocene in which humans constitute the dominant driver of change 
to the Earth System. 4 The Holocene began approximately 10,000 to 12,000 years 
ago and it provided congenial conditions for the flourishing of human life on our 
planet. In the Holocene ice ages disappeared and the earth s climate was warmer 
and relatively stable compared to what had existed immediately before.5  
Under these favorable conditions, during the Holocene humans made the 
transition from hunting and gathering to settled agricultural societies. Therefore, 
the stable and warmer conditions of the Holocene made it possible for humans to 
develop economically, socially and intellectually. These developments laid the 
foundation for the Anthropocene, which is marked by a transformation of the earth 
due to human activities. In other words, the favorable conditions of the Holocene 
led to an expansion of production, which led to the greater exploitation of our 
planet, which has now led us to a new age. Unlike previous ages, however, the 
                                                             
4 ROCKSTROM, Johan et al. Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for Humanity. 
Ecology and Society, v. 14, n. 2, 2009. Disponível em: 
<https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss2/art32/>. Accessed June 21, 2019. Emphasis 
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5 ROBERTS, Neil. The Holocene: An Environmental History. 2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell, 1998.  
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Anthropocene is one that is the product of the changes that humans have wrought 
on the planet.  
According to Julia Adeney Thomas, the Anthropocene 
 
can be measured in three complementary ways--through the planetary 
boundaries  concept proposed by Johan Rockström and colleagues, the 
great acceleration  proposed by Will Steffen and colleagues, and, most 
explicitly, through the planetary stratum (GSSP) marking the shift from 
the Holocene Epoch, which is now under consideration by the 
Anthropocene Working Group.6 
 
Some scholars speculate that human activity produced changes at the 
planetary level even several thousand years ago. For instance, the retreat of ice 
ages and the establishment of the Holocene itself ago may have been human 
produced: the cutting down of forests and the invention of agriculture may have 
slightly elevated carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere, which had a warming 
effect. This interpretation has been disputed, however. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
throughout the Holocene humans reshaped local environments, as distinct from 
planetary systems, in significant ways, whether through the use of fire, 
deforestation, or manipulating waterways.  
From about 1800 the human impact on the earth and its systems 
commenced, accelerating from 1945, marking the shift to a new planetary age, the 
Anthropocene. A key development was the growing consumption of fossil fuels, 
whose combustion emits carbon dioxide, increasing levels of that gas in the 
atmosphere and producing warming of the planet. However, the Anthropocene is 
more than climate change and it encompasses the transformation of a number of 
planetary systems, including the lithosphere, where human-made compounds 
dwarf those occurring naturally, and the oceans, which have been chemically 
altered by a number of human actions, and the biosphere where a sixth 
extinction  looms.7 
                                                             
6 THOMAS, Julia; WILLIAMS, Mark; ZALASIEWICZ, Jan. The Anthropocene: A Multidisciplinary 
Approach. [s. l.]: Polity Press, forthcoming 2020. 
7 THOMAS, Julia. Why the Anthropocene  Is Not Climate Change  and Why It Matters. AsiaGlobal 
Online. Disponível em: <https://www.asiaglobalonline.hku.hk/anthropocene-climate-change/>. 
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The higher levels of carbon dioxide in our air alone has already had 
profound consequences with the warming of the earth, the melting of glaciers, the 
rise in sea levels, and the acidification of the oceans. These changes to the earth s 
systems means a departure from the congenial conditions of the Holocene, leading 
to a less predictable planetary and potentially mass extinctions. The future of 
humans on the planet is now uncertain as we leave the Holocene behind for the 
uncertainties of the Anthropocene.  
Will Steffen, Paul J. Crutzen and John R. McNeill have divided the 
Anthropocene into three periods. The first, which runs from ca.1800-1945, they label the Industrial Era.  Although coal had been used in several parts of the world 
before the nineteenth century, and in some places on a sizable scale, its use 
expanded enormously, first in Britain and then elsewhere in this period. 
Industrialization intensified the exploitation of the planet s resources and it had a 
profound environmental impact. The most serious was on the atmosphere. By 
1950 levels of methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) had risen to about 1250 
and 228 parts per billion (volume) respectively. This is a significant increase from 
their pre-industrial levels of 850 and 272 ppbv. The concentration of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere had risen from a pre-industrial level of 270-275 parts 
per million (volume) to over 300 ppmv.8 
The second period, which they call the Great Acceleration,  covers the mid-
twentieth century to the early twenty-first. In these decades, human economic 
activity, and thus impact on the planet, intensified enormously. While population 
doubled, economic production increased more than 15-fold. Fossil fuel use 
increased dramatically with the shift to a petroleum economy. One marker of this 
is the explosion in motor vehicles from some 40 million at the conclusion of World 
War II to more than 700 million by 1996. The higher levels of production and 
consumption have had a serious impact on our planetary eco-systems. To 
enumerate all of these would yield a long list, but among the most important 
changes were in the atmosphere where concentrations of several important gases 
have risen significantly, leading to planetary warming and climate destabilization.  
                                                             
8 STEFFEN, Will; CRUTZEN, Paul; MCNEILL, John. The Anthropocene: Are Humans Now 
Overwhelming the Forces of Nature. Ambio, v. 36, n. 8, p. 614-21, 2007. p. 616. 
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The final period is the future. Steffen, Crutzen and McNeill label this Stewards of the Earth System?  The fact of the Anthropocene is now becoming 
more widely known and acknowledged. The question that remains is whether 
humans can mobilize themselves and resources to avert some of the worst 
possible consequences of the changes we have wrought upon our planet. As 
historians, we must at a minimum be aware of these momentous issues and 
perhaps even contribute to the debates around them.  
 
Theorizing History Writing in the Anthropocene 
 Several historians have already been engaged in discussions around the 
Anthropocene. Not surprisingly, environmental historians have been at the 
forefront, including John McNeill whose essay with an atmospheric chemist and a 
climate scientist was discussed in the previous section.  In a review essay, the 
economic and environmental historian of Britain, Fredrik Albritton Jonsson, has 
surveyed recent writings on the Industrial Revolution in the context of the 
Anthropocene. His central claim is sobering: The idea of the Anthropocene 
suggests that the Industrial Revolution constituted not a conclusive escape from 
natural limits but a temporary reprieve bought with finite fossil fuel stock, which 
in turn may be undone by climate change and other environmental threats 
unleashed unwittingly by economic development. 9 
 Albritton Jonsson divides recent writings on the industrial revolution into 
two groups and he calls the two perspectives that they represent a major problem 
of the Anthropocene.  The first sees environmental pressures as critical in shaping 
the path of economic change and development. The second decouples economic 
growth from its material context and sees it as a propelled by an information 
economy. He traces both these perspectives to the Enlightenment, but for our 
purposes, Albritton Jonsson s review essay points to the urgent need to theorize 
the implications of the Anthropocene for the writing of history. I will return to an 
important contribution that Albritton Jonsson makes in this direction later in the 
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v. 84, p. 679-96, 2012. p. 680-1. 
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paper, but I will first examine Dipesh Chakrabarty s ambitious attempt to link 
current debates in history to those in climate change.  
 Chakrabarty s starting point is that as a consequence of the accumulation of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, certain scientific propositions have come 
into circulation in the public domain that have profound, even transformative, 
implications for how we think about human history. 10 This leads him to formulate 
four theses on writing history in the Anthropocene.  
 Thesis one states that the Anthropocene must spell the collapse of the age-
old humanist distinction between natural history and human history. 11 This 
distinction takes a variety of forms. One can be traced back via R. G.Collingwood 
and Croce to Vico (although it may be a misreading of Vico, according to 
Chakrabarty) and argues that humans can only have proper knowledge of political 
and civil institutions, which they made, in contrast to nature, which is made by 
God. Proper history is then the history of human affairs. A second is the belief in 
the essentially unchanging or very slow changing character of the natural world, 
which is the perspective that informs works such as Fernand Braudel s 
Mediterranean. The Anthropocene shatters both approaches. 
Thesis two posits a severe qualification of humanist histories of modernity/globalization. 12 Freedom and reason have been central concerns of 
historians of the modern period and modernity seen as representing an expansion 
of both. The grim future that the Anthropocene poses, however, challenges the 
narrative of the steady march of freedom and the belief in the power of reason to 
rescue humanity from such a dark future. The Anthropocene also throws into 
question the quest for social justice, which may be overwhelmed by the challenges 
posed by climate change.  Thesis three, according to Chakrabarty, requires us to put global histories 
of capital in conversation with the species history of humans. 13 The threat that the 
Anthropocene poses for the survival of the human species must be integrated with 
                                                             
10 CHAKRABARTY, Dipesh. The Climate of History: Four Theses. Critical Inquiry, v. 35, n. 2, p. 197-
222, 2009. p. 198. 
11 Ibidem. p. 201.  
12 Ibidem. p. 207.  
13 Ibidem. p. 212.  
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the critique of capital in its global form. This means more conversations between 
practitioners of different disciplines. While capitalist industrialization is critical for 
understanding the beginnings of the Anthropocene, its impact cannot be 
understood without reference to the species. This requires reconciling the 
particular, local histories of capital with the universal history of the human species, 
which will mean novel ways for historians to think and write.  
Finally, thesis four states that the cross-hatching of species history and the history of capital  will probe the limits of historical understanding. 14 Much 
historical thinking draws upon, at the end of the day, the ability to imagine human 
experience in the past. Species thinking, however, does not rest upon such experience. As Chakrabarty writes, We humans never experience ourselves as a 
species.  To make sense of the Anthropocene then requires thinking beyond the 
boundaries of what has shaped historical writing to this point in time. That is the probing of the limits of historical understanding.  
The Anthropocene, then, according to Chakrabarty poses significant issues 
of integration in which the global histories of capital and the modern are brought 
together with biology and geology. Time, species, capital, and freedom, social 
justice as well as human consciousness must be rethought to take into account the 
unprecedented geological epoch we humans have created. While this paper cannot 
take up all these issues, it will make a small contribution in Chakrabarty s spirit to 
a history in the Anthropocene with a focus on the problem of divergence.  
 
Divergence in the Anthropocene 
 Nowhere in my book on divergence, Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia Did 
Not, is the Anthropocene mentioned. Nevertheless, the reality that human actions 
have transformed the systems of our planet, with profound biological 
consequences for humans as well as countless other species, informs the 
arguments of the book. In this paper I will address three ways in which my book is 
shaped by the Anthropocene and is an effort to respond to that crisis. These are, 
first, a rejection of economic determinism; second, an emphasis on human actions, 
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and in particular the state, as opposed to iron laws of economics; and third, a 
questioning of value judgments that elevate growth over other possible economic 
or social goals.  
 
Economic Determinism 
 Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia Did Not explicitly rejected a deterministic 
view of economic change before the nineteenth century. It argued that 
industrialization was an unintended consequence of the search for the solution to 
the pressures that Britain faced in the eighteenth century, most critically global 
competition in the most manufactured good in the world at that time, cotton 
textiles, and mounting shortages of wood. The book argued that there was no 
common endpoint of economic development, however, and other regions of the 
world were following their own paths as given by political and economic 
conditions and pressures. This, of course, changes in the nineteenth century when 
the industrialization of Britain and then western and central Europe made a 
modern industrial society the desirable goal of economic change. This was true in 
both capitalist and socialist nations in the twentieth century.  
 I made the argument for non-deterministic approaches on the grounds that 
for the period before the nineteenth century to impose a common endpoint to 
economic change was anachronistic. It was projecting a historical category, 
industrial society, an idea which dates from the 1830s, to an earlier era which did 
not know such a category. The Anthropocene provides intellectual material in 
support of a non-deterministic framework.  
 E. H. Carr famously wrote that history is an unending dialogue between 
present and past. 15 For Carr, the present shaped the writing of history because 
historians are a product of their times and the questions they ask of the past and 
how they approach the facts of the past are shaped by the present in which 
historians live and work. In the study of divergence, for instance, the current 
reinvigorated debate that is putting China and India in new contexts, which are in 
turn giving rise to new frameworks for explanation, as well as the critique of 
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Eurocentrism, have emerged as a consequence of the changing positions of these 
nations in the contemporary global economy.  
 The philosopher of history, Louis Mink, also argued that history is a 
dialogue between the present and the past. He, however, provided a different 
argument for why our understanding of the past is constantly changing. Mink 
argued that each generation must rewrite its history because history never stands 
still. Because history marches forward and reaches a different endpoint, historians 
must revise their narratives to take into account the new ending.16 (It may be appropriate to recall here Eric Hobsbawm s definition of history as the story of 
how humans got from the Paleolithic age to the Nuclear Age. 17) 
 Armed with this insight from Louis Mink, we may now venture some 
arguments about the impact of the Anthropocene on writing about divergence. The 
Anthropocene has posed for humanity unprecedented uncertainty about where 
our global economy is headed. We, perhaps for the first time and certainly on a 
world scale, do not know what the future holds for us. And previous 
approximations that the future will look more or less similar to the recent past are 
no longer tenable.  
 The predictions for the future of the planet and the species range from mass 
extinctions, enormous rises in sea levels, which will inundate densely populated 
coastal areas around the world, severe droughts in major agricultural regions, to 
the shrinking of major rivers due to the melting of glaciers. The impact of these 
changes on economic life threatens the sheer survival of billions around the globe 
and perhaps of the human species as a whole.  
 Given this situation, we must write histories that assume nothing about the 
direction or path of change. Our indeterminate present and future must be 
matched by an indeterminate past. This is why I insisted on the multiple paths of 
economic change in the period before the Anthropocene. As we entered the 
Anthropocene, however, those paths merged into one, the one based on the 
exploitation of fossil fuels, and which has produced the dilemma we face today. But 
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as we reflect on history writing in the high Anthropocene, the plurality of paths 
from this point forward seems increasingly apparent.  
 
Human Action 
 Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia Did Not insisted upon the importance of 
human choice and actions in the shaping of economic change, and thus divergence. 
In this, it was writing against much work in economics and economic history that 
sees outcomes as the product of iron laws. These laws can take Smithian form, in 
which economic development is a result of the expansion of the market and the 
extension of the division of labor; Marxian, which sees the economy as developing 
in certain ways as a consequence of institutions, most critically those that shape 
the market and property rights; and neoclassical, which sees economic change as 
the outcome of market allocation processes. Within writings on industrialization 
and economic divergence, an example of the first is Adam Smith himself; of the 
second is Robert Brenner; and of the third is Robert Allen. These writings differ in 
terms of theoretical framework, but share the commitment to economic conditions 
leading automatically to particular outcomes.  
 My book questioned and criticized the iron laws of economics in several 
ways. Its emphasis on context was to show that similar economic institutions and 
conditions could yield vastly different outcomes, depending on the economic, 
political and environmental conditions or situation. This insight built upon several 
recent developments in economic theory, including behavioral economics, which 
posited plural forms of human action due to phenomena such as loss aversion  
and status quo bias,  and information economics. In the case of the latter area, 
Joseph Stiglitz wrote, Economies with the same deep properties could have markedly different equilibria. 18 
In a similar vein, economic actors in the past chose to focus on different 
issues, which led to vastly different outcomes. For example, in the eighteenth 
century political authorities in China, the Ottoman Empire and Britain engaged in 
provisioning their populations with essential goods. The Chinese developed a vast 
                                                             
18 STIGLITZ, Joseph. The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century 
Economics. Quarterly Journal of Economics, v. 115, n. 4, p. 1441-1478, 2000. 
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granary system, which Bin Wong and others have written about in great detail, 
which ensured that sufficient supplies of grain were available to the inhabitants of 
the Qing Empire. This entailed moving grain from surplus to deficit areas, storage 
systems for grain, and in some cases the accumulation and distribution of money 
for the purchase of grain. In the Ottoman case, a provisioning motive shaped the 
attitude of the empire towards trade. Imported Indian cottons were welcomed as 
they created abundant supplies of cloth at low prices for the subjects of the sultan. 
The difficulties of local manufacturers in the face of external competition were 
given less consideration. Finally, in Britain the provisioning of London with cheap 
coal became critical for the peace of the realm and became an important element of 
British policy. In retrospect it is easy to see that the provisioning of coal had major 
ramifications for long-run economic development. The provisioning of grain and 
cloth contributed in the short-run to well-being, but in the long-run less to 
economic change in China and the Ottoman Empire. In fact, in the case of cloth, the 
provisioning attitude may have impeded economic activity in some regions under 
Ottoman control.  
What does all this have to do with the Anthropocene? First, an approach 
which sees the economy as the creation of humans opens up enormous 
possibilities for thinking about the present as well as the future. As we attempt to 
deal with the crisis caused by the transformation of the earth s systems, it is critical 
to remember that the economy is not subject to laws that are immutable. The 
diverging responses to wood shortages in the eighteenth century well illustrate 
this. In Britain, with state support coal came to be used in increasing quantities. In 
Japan, at the same moment, a strategy to restore and regenerate forests was 
followed, which stabilized the ecology of the archipelago. Therefore, there is no 
automatic response to what was a common problem, but diverse ones. We will 
have occasion to return to this example in the next section of the paper.  
Second, an important reason the economy took a variety of paths in the 
eighteenth century is that state actions and policies shaped the path of economic 
change. Therefore, the economy is not simply the unfolding of the market and/or 
institutions but emerges from politics and the choices of political authorities. In 
our current dilemma, a response to climate change and the other consequences of 
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the Anthropocene will require significant state action. This runs counter to the free 
market enthusiasm of our age. This enthusiasm has also shaped writings on 
divergence (think of the work of Robert Allen, for instance, which rests on very 
simple neoclassical theory) in which the state does not enter at all in many 
contributions. Therefore, the present and past are intertwined in writings on 
divergence. While the Washington Consensus has produced market-centered 
explanations, historical accuracy, as well as the Anthropocene, demands that the 
state be brought into the picture.  
 
Growth 
 In a review essay on recent writings on the British industrial revolution, 
Fredrik Albritton Jonsson concludes that the Anthropocene calls into question the 
teleology of growth intrinsic to the concept of modernity. 19 The crisis posed by the 
human transformation of planetary systems means that the earth can no longer 
accommodate further economic growth. The accumulation of greenhouse gases in 
our atmosphere has already reached critical levels. The planetary boundaries 
analysis showed that at the time of the initial study in 2009 climate, biodiversity 
and biochemical flows had exceeded the boundary of safety. Of the remaining 
seven planetary systems, two had not yet been quantified and five fell into a murky 
middle ground or remained within the limits of safety.20  
Writings on divergence privilege growth over other economic goals and 
possibilities, such as security for all or equality, which may be achieved with little 
or no growth. And in general, economic historians view the performance of low 
growth or more stationary economies as inferior to the growth-oriented path that 
emerged in Europe from the eighteenth century. And as the contrasting responses 
of Britain and Japan to the crisis of wood that both places experienced in the 
eighteenth century, growth that displaces the problem is not the only solution to 
an ecological crisis. Therefore, writings on divergence are value-laden.  
Such values may be seen in a review of Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia Did 
Not in which the author, Jan de Vries, refers to my description of eighteenth-
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century India as Happy India. 21 While the favorable economic conditions in the 
Indian subcontinent in the eighteenth century cannot be universalized because 
they rested on a high-value manufactured goods export economy, those conditions 
were undoubtedly superior to what followed in the nineteenth and twentieth 
century.  
But more troubling are the judgments that are implicit in the statement. The 
first is that pre-modern economic conditions were inferior to those that emerged 
in the modern. This was certainly not the case for the vast majority of the 
population of India, where living standards for laborers declined over the course of 
the nineteenth and twentieth century. Admittedly the evidence for this claim is 
largely impressionistic. Solid data is hard to find, assemble and interpret, but the 
heavy toll of famines in the second half of the nineteenth century—20 million may 
have perished in India between 1865 and 1900 and such mortality had no 
precedent in Indian history—indicates the precariousness of life for large 
numbers. As we are coping with the devastation wrought by the early 
manifestations of climate change, it appears reasonable to ask if the modern 
economy with its prioritization of growth has turned into a nightmare.  
The second is that the European path was the superior one because it 
produced more economic growth. (At a conference on my book at the London 
School of Economics I was asked by a European historian, who was frustrated by 
my framework of multiple paths of change in the eighteenth century, if I wouldn t 
concede that the European path was the better one.) This raises questions related 
to profound Eurocentrisms in history writing, but this is not where I want to go. 
More critical for the purposes of this paper is the assumption that the path which 
would lead to modern industrial society was superior and the true source of 
economic well-being and perhaps even happiness and satisfaction. Anthony 
Wrigley has recently concluded his study of energy and the English industrial 
revolution with the image of Pandora s jar. Opening Pandora s jar has brought great benefits, but also countervailing dangers,  Wrigley writes. Some of the most 
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dangerous arise from the heat-trapping gases that the combustion of fossil fuels 
releases into the atmosphere, Wrigley warns. 
 
Conclusion: The Question of Convergence 
 When I tell non-historians about my book, the usual response is, Well, it s 
no longer the case that Europe is rich and Asia is not.  There is a popular 
perception that Asia is catching up with Europe (as well as North America) in 
terms of income and standards of living. While this may be case for pockets of 
China and groups in India and Southeast Asia, this is certainly not the case for Asia 
as a whole. And it will likely never be the case, now that we are in the 
Anthropocene, which has profound implications for the possibility of global 
convergence in standards of living and income.  
 The reason for this is that we are in a state of ecological overshoot. 
Sometime in the 1970s or 1980s, the precise timing varies from study to study, 
humans began to extract every year more resources than could be regenerated by 
our planet. Ecologists labeled this overshoot. In a word humanity has exceeded the 
planet s capacity. This situation has been detailed with respect to forests, water, 
soil, air, as well as other dimensions of our natural world. And according to some 
estimates, we now require nearly one and a half planets to sustain current levels of 
production and consumption.22 To put it in the scientific framework of the 
Anthropocene, because of human activity we are no longer within the safe 
operating space for the planet. This means we are exhausting the planet, which is 
the source of our livelihoods.  
 It has taken so many planetary resources for the prosperous regions of the 
world (along with some prosperous people in the poorer regions) that there is 
simply not enough to go around for convergence to take place on current economic 
trajectories. The growth of the north, then, has consumed our planet, leaving little 
for those regions that did not climb on these paths of economic change in the 
nineteenth or twentieth century. The conditions that created the Anthropocene are 
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those that produced overshoot, which means that present distributions of income 
and wealth across the world are not likely to dramatically change any time in the 
near future. Yet, they must, if we are to have a world free of hunger and poverty 
and in which we lay claim to economic and social justice. For we can no longer 
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